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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(j). This case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action to determine the extent of Gary B. Stanford's, Appellant herein 
("Stanford"), liability under a personal guarantee which was part of a second trust deed note 
executed by him in favor of the Parks in July 1995. 
II. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
In December 2005, the Kang S. Park and Marsha Park, Appellees herein ("Parks"), 
moved for summary judgment asking the court to determine that none of the payments that 
had been received by them to date applied to Stanford's obligation under the guarantee. 
Upon the completion of briefing, the court determined (R. 781, p. 13, 14) that none of the 
payments that had been received by Parks reduced Stanford's $500,000 personal guarantee. 
(The trial court also stated that it could not determine as a matter of law that there would not 
be a deficiency judgment in favor of Security Mutual on their underlying first trust deed, and 
refused to fix the amount of Stanford's liability under his guarantee of the second trust deed 
obligation owed to Parks at this time. (R. 781, p. 13.)) 
In a second motion for summary judgment initiated in August 2006 ( R. 402), the 
Parks asked the trial court to fix the amount of Stanford's liability on the basis that the value 
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of the property was such that the trial court could determine as a matter of law that there 
would be no deficiency judgment against Stanford in favor of the holder of the first trust 
deed, Security Mutual Life Insurance. The trial court denied Parks' motion. (R. 781, p. 29, 
1. 12-20.) 
In December 2007, as a result of a bankruptcy filed by Snowmass, LLC (United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, Case No. 07-23458 GEC, petition attached as Exhibit 
4) and a notice from Security Mutual (Exhibit 5 attached), the Bank of Utah, as custodian 
of the Kang S. Park IRA, purchased the first trust deed note and first trust deed interest of 
Security Mutual Life in the property, and waived its right to pursue a deficiency action 
against Stanford based on the first trust deed. (Affidavit of Kang S. Park, R. 616.) 
Thereafter, the Parks filed the final motion for summary judgment which led to the 
determination of the amount owed by Stanford pursuant to his guarantee. (R. 598.) 
After judgment was entered in June, 2008 (R. 765), the interest of Security Mutual 
which had been purchased by the Bank of Utah as Custodian for the Kang S. Park IRA, was 
foreclosed at a trustee's sale of the property. (Trustee's Deed, Exhibit 1 attached.) No 
deficiency action has been pursued based on the first trust deed, consistent with paragraph 
4 of the Judgment ( R. 765) which provides in part as follows: 
4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs endorse 
on the face of the original Note given by Snowmass, LLC to Security 
Mutual Life Insurance Company the following: 'The right to obtain a 
deficiency judgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to 
the judgment entered in Civil No. 050900073 in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake City, State of Utah in the matter entitled KangS. Park 
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and Marsha Park v. Gary B. Stanford." The endorsement shall be 
placed on the Note as reflected in Exhibit "A" attached to this 
judgment. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parks acknowledge that this matter was resolved in the trial court on summary 
judgment ( R. 765.) Accordingly, there can be no dispute of material facts. However, 
Stanford's statement of facts (Brief, p. 10-15) fails to include a number of undisputed 
material facts critical to this Court's review of the judgment, including the following: 
1. The initial Real Estate Purchase Contract between Parks and Snowmass which 
conveyed commercial property in Ogden, Utah (the "property") provided in Addendum 2, 
paragraph 3 (R. 213), that Stanford "will personally guarantee the payment of $500,000 plus 
interest. . .." 
2. Stanford acknowledged that during the period between the October 1994 letter 
(Stanford's statement of facts, Tfl 1, p. 11) and the July, 1995 Trust deed Note (Stanford's 
Statement of Facts, ^ | 21), there had been discussions between his co-member (in Snowmass), 
Richard (Dix) Buckway, and Parks' counsel, Frederick Prince, about the transaction. 
Stanford conceded that he did not know what the nature of these discussions had been, and 
doubted that any changes were designed to enhance his position. (Stanford deposition, p. 85; 
R. 124, 341.) 
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3. In July 1995, a new (second) trust deed note and trust deed were executed by 
Stanford both as a member of Snowmass, LC, and in his individual capacity as a guarantor. 
The July 1995 Trust Deed Note ("Note") provides in part as follows: 
By his signature, individually, on this Note, Gary B. Stanford agrees to 
unconditionally guarantee the payment of this Note, but in no event 
shall Gary B. Stanford's liability (excluding portions thereof 
attributable to interests and costs) when added to any deficiency 
judgment which may be entered against him by virtue of his guarantee 
of the Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. Note (excluding interest and 
costs), exceed the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($500,000). (R. 106, 2nd para.) 
4. Stanford acknowledged that he did not discuss his understanding of the 
guarantee with Parks or their counsel. (Stanford depo. p. 86, 88; R. 123, 341.) In fact, 
Stanford did not have any discussions with anyone about the language in his guarantee in the 
Note. (Stanford depo., p. 83,1. 6-9; pp. 33,136; R. 126,130,117.) Stanford acknowledged 
that "I probably had a fairly lax attitude in signing these documents and things. Which I wish 
I had never done, of course. I didn't go over them with a lawyer or, anyone else having to 
do with it, so." (Stanford depo., p. 83-84; R. 340.) 
5. If Stanford had some different understanding about the extent of his guarantee 
apart from the language in the 1995 Note, he did not reveal it to the Parks. In addition to the 
testimony referred to in the preceding paragraph, Stanford testified that he was not present 
when Mr. Buckway negotiated the Note (Stanford depo., p. 33, 85; R. 337,341); he never 
discussed the scope of his guarantee with Dr. Park or his wife (Stanford depo. p. 88; R. 341); 
he doesn't remember the scope of his guarantee ever being a matter of discussion (Stanford 
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depo. p. 35; R. 337); he had no discussions with anyone about the language of the guarantee 
in the Note even though it was inconsistent with his understanding (Stanford depo. p. 83; R. 
340); when he signed the Note, he expressed no concern to anyone about the guarantee 
language in the Note (Stanford depo. p. 84; R. 340); Buckway kept telling him Parks were 
asking for changes, he signed them, and he regrets doing so (Stanford depo. p. 83-84; R. 
340). 
6. Stanford expressly acknowledged that he did not tell anyone that he had any 
problem with any of the language in the 1995 Trust deed Note. (Stanford depo., pp. 33 and 
84; R. 337, 340.) 
7. Stanford's statement of facts refers to the affidavit of J. R. Christensen. (Para. 
21, page 6.) There is no evidence that J.R. Christensen played any role in the negotiation of 
any aspect of the note or the guarantee, or that he was involved in the 1995 transaction. 
8. During calendar year 1998, Richard Buckway and Stanford terminated their 
business relationship as it related to Snowmass. Stanford became the sole member of 
Snowmass, LLC at that time. (Stanford affidavit, R. 201, at % 40.) For many years, Stanford 
was the only member of Snowmass, LLC. 
9. There is no evidence that Stanford ever advised Parks at any time that any 
payments being made to the Parks were being made "based on Dr. Stanford's personal 
guarantee." (Cf. ^ 26, p. 14 of Stanford's Opening Brief ("Stanford's brief').) 
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10. In 1997, an Amendment was made to the 1995 Note and Trust Deed. In that 
amendment, Stanford, as the Managing Member of Snowmass, and personally, agreed that 
in the event of any default under the Note, Parks were to give notice of the default to "...Gary 
B. Stanford at the following address: Gary B. Stanford, M.D., 1250 East 3900 South, Ste. 
310, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124." (See the Amendment, R. 330, f 5.) 
11. The property has not had a tenant in it since approximately 2002. (Stanford 
depo., p. 28.) No payments of any type have been made by Snowmass to Parks for many 
years. (Fraidenburg affidavit, R. 416.) 
12. In March, 2007, Security Mutual filed a notice of default against Snowmass 
and the property based on its first trust deed. (See Trustees Deed, pg. 2, para, (a), Exhibit 1 
attached.) Security Mutual set a sale on its foreclosure on July 31, 2007. (See Notice of 
Sale, Exhibit 3 attached.) On July 27, 2007, Snowmass, acting through its sole member, 
Stanford, filed bankruptcy. (See Petition, Exhibit 4.) On November 15, 2007, Security 
Mutual (now, Equitable Life and Casualty) solicited offers to sell its trust deed and note and 
claims in the Snowmass bankruptcy. (See Exhibit 5.) In December 2007, the Bank of Utah 
as Custodian for the Kang S. Park IRA ("Bank of Utah") purchased the interest of Security 
Mutual (which included the first trust deed against the Snowmass property) for a sum slightly 
in excess of $250,000. (Kang Park affidavit, para. 2, R. 616.) 
13. Thereafter, the IRA and Parks sought and obtained relief from the automatic 
stay in the Snowmass bankruptcy, and the Bank of Utah as Custodian noticed and conducted 
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a non-judicial foreclosure of the property based on the first trust deed originally held by 
Security Mutual dated March 12, 1992. (R. 618, and Trustees' Deed, Exhibit 1 attached.) 
The sale was conducted on July 31, 2008. (Stanford's brief, Exhibit A.) The sole bidder at 
the sale was the Bank of Utah, as Custodian, who purchased the property by bidding 
$200,000. (Trustee's deed, Exhibit 1 attached hereto.) 
14. No deficiency action has ever been pursued by the Bank of Utah against 
Stanford. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because far more than $500,000 in principal remained owing on the second trust deed 
note that Stanford guaranteed, and because the language of that guarantee specifically 
excluded interest from the $500,000 limitation, the trial court properly determined that 
Stanford owed Parks $500,000 in principal, plus interest. 
Next, Stanford cannot show that the trial court erred when it refused to credit certain 
payments against his guarantee. The unexpressed subjective beliefs of Stanford or his 
colleagues about his guarantee cannot alter or affect the unambiguous language in the final 
Note. Indeed, the argument that all payments made by Stanford should have been credited 
to his guarantee ignores applicable case law, and is without any factual support. 
Last, given the circumstances of Snowmass' default on the first trust deed, their 
bankruptcy, and the foreclosure, Stanford is not entitled to any offset against the judgment, 
which is based on a separate note and trust deed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATELY USED TO DETERMINE 
THE FACT AND EXTENT OF STANFORD'S LIABILITY. 
The "major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing 
the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to 
the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984); see also Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, If 20, 136 P.3d 1252. Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the 
"moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a 
motion for summary judgment is properly supported, an adverse party may not rest on 
allegations only, but "by affidavits or as otherwise provided ... must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue" of fact. Id. 
Here, the material facts are not in dispute. The dispositive provision of the 1995 Note 
provides that Stanford 
agrees to unconditionally guarantee the payment of this Note, 
but in no event shall Gary B. Stanford's liability (excluding 
portions thereof attributable to interests and costs) when added 
to any deficiency judgment which may be entered against him 
by virtue of his guarantee of the Security Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., Note (excluding interest and costs), exceed the sum of 
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($500,000). 
(R. 105 at 106.) Stanford concedes that this provision is facially unambiguous, but argues 
that it is rendered ambiguous by the terms of certain prior correspondence. (See Stanford's 
brief, pp. 18-20.) This argument is without merit. 
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"In Utah, a court may grant summary judgment enforcing a contract when the contract 
terms are 'complete, clear, and unambiguous.'" Youngv. Wardley Corp, 2008 UT App 104, 
U 9 (quoting Aspenwood, LLC v. CA. T., LLC, 2003 UT App 28,1f 30, 73 P.3d 947). "'If the 
language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then a court does not resort 
to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a court determines the parties' intentions 
from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting 
Bakowskiv. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, U 16, 52P.3d 1179. "In analyzing the 
language in the [contract], '[i]t is [the trial] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the 
parties as expressed in the plain language of the [contract's] covenants.'" Id., <[J 10 (quoting 
Holladay Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells, 2002 UT App 125, Tj 2, 47 P.3d 104. "'The trial 
court is to consider "[e]ach contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view 
to giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Id. (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)). 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "before permitting recourse to extrinsic 
evidence, a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Daynes v. Vincent, 2008 
UT 51, Tf 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, even if a judge decides to consider extrinsic evidence, he or 
she must ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the 
language of the contract." Id., ^ 26 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268). "Thus, a correct 
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application of the Ward rule to determine what the writing means begins and ends with the 
language of the contract." Id., H 30. 
Here, in order to determine that Stanford's guarantee in the 1995 Note is ambiguous, 
this Court must first conclude that the language of the guarantee is "capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other 
facial deficiencies." Peterson v. The Sunrider Corporation, 2002 UT 43, ^ 19, 43 P.3d 918. 
Stanford does not argue that this is the case. To the contrary, the language of the guarantee 
states in two separate instances that the $500,000 cap "excludes interest." (R. 106.) 
The only way this language regarding interest, when compared to any other document, 
can create an ambiguity is if it is readout o/the Note altogether. This expressly contradicts 
the rule of contract interpretation that a trial court give effect to all contract provisions and 
ignore none, see Young v. Wardley Corp, 2008 UT App 104, \ 10, as well as the rule that 
parole evidence may not be used to distinguish or contradict the terms of the contract, see 
Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc., 866 P.2d 604, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Nowhere in the language of the guarantee is there any hint of ambiguity regarding the fact 
that interest is excluded from the $500,000 cap. 
Stanford presents no facts to support his argument that the language recited above is 
ambiguous. In this case, as in Daynes, Stanford relies on a series of prior communications 
which were contrary to express language in the final agreement. Indeed, Stanford attempts 
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to rely on letters exchanged more than eight months prior (September and October 1994) to 
the time that the Note and trust deed were ultimately executed (July 1995). 
More specifically, Stanford contends that the guarantee is rendered ambiguous by 
virtue of the following language in the second Trust deed Note: 
Such security instruments and all other instruments evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of this Note 
and are deemed incorporated herein in full. 
In effect, Stanford is arguing that the September and October, 1994 letters "evidence . . . the 
indebtedness." (Stanford's brief, p. 19-21.) 
This argument fails in light of Stanford's own concessions about the events between 
October 1994 and July 1995. Stanford acknowledged that between the October 1994 letter, 
and the July 1995 Note, his partner, Dix Buckway, told him that there had been changes 
made in the documents. (Stanford depo., p. 132, R. 343.) Stanford himself recognized that 
he did not know the nature of the discussions that took place between the date of the 
correspondence and his execution of the Note and Trust deed. (Stanford depo., p. 85, 86, R. 
341.) Stanford acknowledged that he did not participate in these negotiations, that he never 
discussed his understanding of the terms of his guarantee with Parks, nor did he tell Parks 
that his understanding was different than what was expressed in the terms of the Note he 
signed. (Stanford depo., p. 86, R. 341.) Indeed, Stanford acknowledged that he did not 
express any problem with the language in the 1995 Note that excluded interest from his cap 
(Stanford depo., p. 83, 84,1. 7-10; R. 340), and acknowledged that it was part of the process 
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that allowed the purchase obligation for the property to be reduced from $1 million to 
$900,000 (Stanford depo., p. 85,1. 5-8; R. 341). Stanford's characterization of events was 
that "Park seemed delighted in making small changes to enhance their position, but I went 
ahead and signed nevertheless." (Stanford depo., p. 85, 1. 1-4; R. 341.) Stanford 
acknowledged that he knew that the changes were not going to enhance his position, and that 
when he signed the Note, he had not discussed his understanding of the guarantee with 
anyone other than his partner, Dix Buckway. (Stanford depo., p. 84,1. 3-10; p. 85, p. 86,1, 
7-11; R. 334-343.) 
Whatever Stanford and Buckway talked about outside of the Parks' presence, and 
what Stanford and JR Christensen discussed in private is inadmissible hearsay. These 
discussions fail to comply with Utah R. Evid. 801 and 802, are inadmissible, and therefore 
cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See 
Waymentv. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 271 ("statements that 
are 'not ... admissible in evidence ... may not be considered on summary judgment under 
Rule 56(e)' (quoting Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983)); see also Walker 
v. Rocky Mtn. Recreation Corp., 508 P. 2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973) (affidavits must "set forth 
facts that would be admissible in evidence...Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not 
be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit."). 
Stanford argues that his guarantee is rendered ambiguous by its reference to "all other 
instruments evidencing or securing the indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of this 
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Note and are deemed incorporated herein in full." The prior letters are not "instruments," 
and do not "evidence" the "indebtedness;" indeed, nowhere does this clause refer to earlier 
correspondence.1 At best, the Real Estate Purchase Contract ( R. 93), which expressly 
includes interest (at R. 96, f^ 3), the September, 1994 letter ( R. 225, J^ 5), which again 
expressly includes interest, the October 1994 letter, and the many conversations and 
discussions that occurred in between, of which Stanford had no knowledge and did not ask 
any questions, reflect the back and forth of discussions culminating in a final agreement 
signed in July 1995, and not part of the contract itself. Other "instruments" evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness, in this case, would have included the (second) 1995 Trust Deed 
in favor of Parks, and Stanford's assumption of the underlying first trust deed evidencing 
Snowmass and Stanford's obligations to Security Mutual, and the separate guarantees that 
Stanford executed in favor of Security Mutual. Accordingly, this argument must fail. 
As a matter of law, Stanford's intention is found in the four corners of the 
unambiguous 1995 Note. Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382,1385 (Utah 1984). 
What Stanford may have silently "intended" is immaterial, unless that intention was 
1
 The argument that this clause somehow leads to the conclusion that the 1995 
Note is not an integrated document, is incorrect and without basis. This clause, like the 
clause in Daynes v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 23, 190 P.3d 1269, specifies that all other 
"instruments evidencing or securing the indebtedness hereunder are hereby made part of 
this Note and are deemed incorporated herein in full." This satisfies the integration 
clause standard described in Daynes. See id. In any event, Stanford fails to explain why, 
either legally or factually, lack of an integration clause would necessarily affect the plain 
language of the Note itself. 
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expressed by him and agreed to by Parks. See Zions First Natl. Bk. v. B. Jensen Interiors, 
781 P.2d 478, 480 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) ("It is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract..."). 
Thus, this Court can conclude, as did the trial court, that the language of Stanford's 
guarantee is unambiguous as a matter of law, and that the cap does not include interest as 
Appellant now claims. 
II. STANFORD FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 
IT REFUSED TO GIVE HIM CREDIT TOWARD HIS GUARANTEE. 
Section II of Stanford's brief, at p. 22, argues that the trial court erred "by not giving 
[Stanford] credit toward his $500,000 guarantee." However, Stanford fails to establish any 
error in connection with this ruling. 
In its June 5,2006 Order, the trial court determined, "as a matter of law, that none of 
the payments made to date by Stanford or Snowmass can be applied so as to reduce the 
$500,000 personal guarantee from Stanford to the plaintiffs." R. 391. Stanford argues that 
reversal is appropriate because every payment made by him must be construed as 
performance upon his guarantee. This argument ignores applicable case law, and is without 
any factual support from the record. 
Stanford's first argument - that all payments received by Parks should necessarily 
have been applied to his guarantee, see Stanford's brief, pp. 23-27, is contrary to applicable 
case law. Absent some clear contractual language, subsequent agreement, or specific 
instruction by the guarantor, Parks were entitled to apply payments received in the manner 
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most beneficial to them. See Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68,75-76 (Hawaii Ct. App. 2000) (citing, 
et alia, Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Atkins & Potter Drilling Corp., 229 F.2d 68, 69 (10th 
Cir. 1956)); Wyandotte Coal & Lime Co. v. Wyandotte Pav. & Constr. Co., 154 P.1012 
(Kansas 1916); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Copper Hills Motor Hotels, Inc., 424P.2d 154, 
156 (Ariz. 1967) ("Neither sureties nor guarantors have the right to control the application 
which either the debtor or creditor makes of the payment." (citations omitted)). 
Rather than address this general rule, Stanford relies heavily on a 1929 New Jersey 
decision, Monmouth Plumbing Supply v. McDonald, 147 A. 627, to support his argument that 
Parks were obligated to credit payments against Stanford's guarantee. Monmouth has never 
been favorably cited by any court in this country, and presents a unique set of facts not 
helpful in this case. In Monmouth, the creditor extended new credit to the guarantor's son 
after the guarantee limit had been paid by the guarantor. Here, there is no assertion, and 
certainly no facts of record to show, that the amount of the loan was increased, as occurred 
in Monmouth, In Monmouth, the claim by the creditor was that the guarantee was a 
continuing guarantee, and could continue to apply to new purchases even after the father of 
the borrower had paid the maximum guarantee amount. Here, the creditor had no reason to 
know or believe that the payments were to be applied to the guarantee, because the guarantor 
never asked or directed that they be applied to the guarantee. The Monmouth case is 
therefore inapposite. 
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There is no record evidence of an agreement by Parks to apply any payments made 
before this dispute arose to the guarantee, and Stanford alleges no facts whatsoever to 
support his argument. "When a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by 
Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact." 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). Absent 
a genuine issue of material fact, "the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the 
applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment." Id. "[B]are contentions, 
unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of 
fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 
P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). 
The only fact asserted in this regard is paragraph 28 of Stafford's "Statement of 
Facts," Stanford's brief, p. 14, which alleges "[w]hen [Stanford] made personal payments 
to the [Parks], he did so believing that the Parks would credit those payments towards his 
$500,000 guarantee." If Stanford "believed" that payments were to be credited against his 
guarantee, and if it was critical to his decision to continue funding Snowmass, he had a legal 
obligation to tell Parks that the payments were to be credited against his guarantee, and 
obtain their consent to this request. See Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68, at 76; Weston Group Inc. 
v. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc., 845 P. 2d 1162, 1167 (Colo. 1993). It is undisputed that 
Stanford never did make such a request, nor did Parks assent to it. Conspicuously absent 
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from Stanford's lengthy affidavit (R. 201) is any statement that he ever advised or requested 
of Parks that any of the payments being made on the Note be credited against his personal 
guarantee. None of the letters from Park to Stanford attached to the affidavit make any 
reference to the guarantee. (R. 241- 261.) There is simply no statement of record that 
Stanford ever advised or requested of Parks that any of the payments being made on the Note 
were to be credited against the personal guarantee. Thus, Stanford offers no facts that 
support his argument that summary judgment was improperly granted. 
Next, Stanford argues that certain payments should have been credited to his 
guarantee because Parks knew that these payments came from Stanford, and were to be so 
applied. See Stanford's brief, pp. 27-29. Stanford argues that summary judgment was 
improper because, "when a lender knows the source of its payment is the guarantor, the 
lender must apply that payment to the guarantor's guaranteed debt." Once again, this 
assertion is neither legally nor factually supported. 
As set forth above, the general rule is that a guarantor cannot control the application 
the creditor makes of its payment. See Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d at 75-76. The exception to this 
rule is where contrary direction is provided pursuant to clear contractual language, or specific 
instruction by the guarantor. Id. The Miller Act cases cited by Stanford, St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Co. v. Dakota Electric Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962) and Broward 
County v. Continental Gas Co., 243 F.Supp.l 18 (S.D. Fla. 1965) do not alter this general 
rule. In St. Paul Fire, the court recognized the general rule ("If the debtor fails so to indicate, 
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the payment is applied as the creditor, within a reasonable time, determines"), 309 F.2d at 
25, but held that the particular facts allowed for application of an equitable exception to the 
general rule, due to the particular knowledge and control of the creditor, which had taken 
over control of the debtor through a voting trust. Id. at 30. Stanford makes no attempt to 
show how this "exception" could apply here. In the Broward County case, another action 
on a surety bond under the Miller Act, the court declined to apply payments to the benefit of 
the guarantor where "the evidence fell far short of showing circumstances that were such as 
to make it reasonable to know from whence the funds came." 243 F.Supp. at 124. 
Stanford's reliance on the Central Blacktop v. Town of Cicero, 519 N.E.2d 972 (Ill.App. 
1988) mdHylandElectric Supply v. FranchiBros. Constr., 378 F.2d 1344 (CA2 1967) cases 
fail for the same reason. Parks were never told the source of the funds or asked to apply 
them to the guarantee. Accordingly, the case law cited by Stanford does not support his 
conclusion that the trial court erred in some fashion. 
In any event, Stanford apparently cites these cases for the proposition that "the 
operative inquiry is whether the lender knows the payment it receives is from a guarantor." 
Stanford's brief, p. 28. Even if this argument was legally sound, it is without any factual 
support. Stanford fails to set forth any record facts that could answer this question in the 
affirmative. Stanford instead relies on the following allegations: 
The facts show that [Stanford] gave [Parks] over $750,000 in 
payments at their request and on behalf of Snowmass. Stanford 
either made those payments personally or transferred his funds 
into Snowmass' account who then made the payment to [Parks]. 
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Stanford's brief at p. 25. Stanford then asserts that "[Appelles] denied that [Stanford] was 
making payments to them in his capacity as guarantor" and that Parks "asserted that while 
they did receive payments from [Stanford], there was no reference to his guarantee." Id. at 
p. 26. Of course, what is missing from such allegations is any fact that Parks knew any 
particular payment was being made by Stanford personally, for application to his guarantee. 
Stanford's blanket assertion is not only without factual basis, but is in distinct contrast to the 
actual evidence of record, to wit: that Parks had no knowledge of the same; that, as of 1998, 
Stanford was the sole member of Snowmass, the primary debtor (R. 207, f 40); and that the 
1997 Amendment to the Trust deed required notices of default to be sent to Stanford's 
personal attention (R. 330). 
The argument that demands for payment were sent to he and Mr. Buckway personally 
adds nothing to this analysis. See Stanford's brief, p. 27. As discussed previously, none of 
these letters make any reference to any guarantee (R. 241-261). There is simply no evidence 
that Parks knew payments came from Stanford, as guarantor, as opposed to Stanford as a 
member of Snowmass, the debtor. 
In short, there is no mention in Stanford's brief, nor in the record, of any fact 
supportive of the assertion that Parks knew or agreed that any payments made to them were 
from Stanford's personal funds and that such funds were to be applied to his guarantee. 
Accordingly, Stanford's argument that a genuine issue of material fact existed on this point 
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is without basis, and Stanford fails to set forth any reason, whether factual or otherwise, to 
reverse the trial court's determination. 
III. STANFORD IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY OFFSET AS A RESULT OF THE 
FORECLOSURE ON THE FIRST TRUST DEED (THE SECURITY MUTUAL 
TRUST DEED). 
Stanford argues that he is entitled to an offset against his guarantee on Parks' second 
Trust Deed Note (the 1995 Note) by virtue of his and Snowmass' default on and the 
subsequent foreclosure of the first trust deed (originally held by Security Mutual) against the 
same property. 
In making this argument, Stanford relies principally upon the Utah decision in Surety 
Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995), and upon Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
As discussed hereinafter, neither of these authorities have application to the facts at hand or 
require an offset in this case. 
When this action began, the property was subject to two trust deeds. The first trust 
deed was held initially by Security Mutual Life Insurance Company. This first trust deed 
secured an obligation, beginning in March 1994, of approximately $265,000 and was recorded 
on March 17, 1992. (R. 433, para. C.) The second trust deed, the trust deed that secured 
Parks, was junior to the interest of Security Mutual Life Insurance Company. (Park's second 
trust deed was recorded on September 12, 1995. R. 566.) In December 2002, (effective 
March 2002) Snowmass, LC, and Stanford as a guarantor, entered into a Loan Extension 
Agreement with Security Mutual which, among other things, finally released Parks from 
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liability on the underlying obligation to Security Mutual, and confirmed and ratified the 
priority and encumbrance of the first trust deed. (R. 433, ^  14 and 6.) 
At some point in time, Snowmass and/or Stanford stopped paying Security Mutual 
(now Equitable Life) and in March, 2007, Security Mutual filed a Notice of Default (Exhibit 
2) against Snowmass and the property on their first trust deed. (See certified copy of 
Trustee's Deed, Exhibit 1 attached. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-28(2)(c), the recitals 
in the Trustee's Deed on the subjects of the notice of default and the notice of sale are 
"conclusive evidence" in favor purchasers.) Security Mutual set a sale based on Snowmass' 
default for July 31, 2007. (See Notice of Sale, Exhibit 3 attached to this brief.) On July 27, 
2007, Snowmass, acting through its sole member, Stanford, filed bankruptcy to avert the sale. 
(See petition, Exhibit 4 attached.) In December, 2007, the Bank of Utah as Custodian for the 
Kang S. Park IRA (Bank of Utah) purchased the interest of Security Mutual for a sum slightly 
in excess of $251,000 (see R. 616). Thereafter, the Bank of Utah sought and obtained relief 
from the automatic stay and conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the first Trust Deed 
on July 31, 2008. (See Trustee's Deed, Exhibit 1 attached.) 
The factors that distinguish this case from the Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 
supra, case and from any restrictions in IJ-C.A. § 57-1-32 are many. First and foremost, the 
Bank of Utah foreclosure sale was not of the same trust deed and note that are the subject of 
Stanford's guarantee in this action. Parks' action against Stanford is based upon the second 
trust deed and Stanford's guarantee thereof. 
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A second distinction is that Kang and Marsha Park were not the owners of both the 
first and the second trust deeds. The first trust deed and the related debt were owned by the 
Bank of Utah as custodian. (R. 616 and Exhibit 1 attached.) 
Finally, the foreclosure of the first trust deed by the Bank of Utah actually had the 
effect of eliminating the second trust deed (which secured the Parks' 1995 Note) as an 
encumbrance against the property. 
Stanford offers no authority, statutory or otherwise, that supports his clam that he is 
entitled to credit against the second trust deed because of a separate foreclosure by a senior 
encumbrance holder on a first trust deed. And logically, such a claim would not make sense. 
The foreclosure of the first trust deed by the Bank of Utah as Custodian eliminated any 
security interests that the second trust deed may have created. 
In the Surety Life case, the trust deed that was foreclosed was the same one to which 
the guarantee applied. That circumstance does not exist in this case. In the Surety Life case, 
the debt guaranteed was the same debt that was the subject of the foreclosure. That is not the 
case here. It was Stanford's and Snowmass' default on a separate obligation, the first trust 
deed, that led to the foreclosure on the first. 
In this case, the second trust deed, the obligation that was guaranteed by Stanford, was 
never foreclosed. 
The restrictions in U.C.A. § 57-1-32 are also inapposite to this case. That statute 
provides in part that it applies to an action ". . . to recover the balance due upon the 
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obligation for which the trust deed was given as security . . . . " As discussed in Surety Life, 
892 P.2d at 3, this limitation applies both to the trust deed and the guarantee. The flaw in 
Stanford's attempt to fall within the protection of the statute is that the guarantee which is the 
focus of this action is not his guarantee of the first trust deed (which is the trust deed that was 
foreclosed).2 
Stanford's discussion at pp. 31-33 also attempts to obfuscate the participants. As 
previously discussed, Stanford had separate guarantees on the Security Mutual Note (R. 702) 
and on the Park Note, and not a single guarantee as Stanford suggests (at p. 32). Contrary to 
Stanford's assertion, it was not the Parks who purchased the Security Mutual Note and 
declared it in default. The note was already in default in July, 2007, when Snowmass filed 
bankruptcy to avoid the foreclosure by Security Mutual. (See Exhibit 1.) Thereafter, the 
Bank of Utah as Custodian of the Kang S. Park IRA purchased the interest of Security 
Mutual. (R. 616.) The Parks did not sell the Ogden property nor did they purchase it at the 
sale that occurred on July 31,2008. The property was sold by Bank of Utah and the property 
was purchased at the sale by the Bank of Utah as Custodian. (See Exhibit 1.) 
The judgment that the Parks received in this action against Stanford did not include any 
amounts attributable to the obligation separately guaranteed by Stanford to Security Mutual. 
(See R. 413 at 414 (para. 4) and 416 (Summary of Balance, Column 1).) Stanford next argues 
2
 Stanford also personally guaranteed payment of the first trust deed. Bank of 
Utah acquired this guarantee as well as the note and trust deed. (See Exhibit 4.) Bank of 
Utah did not and cannot pursue Stanford on this separate guarantee. 
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that because he has lost the right to look to the property, Parks should be denied any recovery 
against him. (Page 33.) In effect, Stanford's argument is that the guarantor of any junior 
encumbrance should be relieved from liability on his guarantee if a senior encumbrance 
forecloses. This result is not warranted by logic, or supported by Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper 
Co., 907 P.2d 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The Mead Corp. case deals with letters of credit and equitable subrogation, and has no 
factual relationship to this case. The actual holding in Mead Corp. is that equitable 
subrogation does not apply to letters of credit. See id. at 1188. The language quoted by 
Stanford is actually from another Utah case, Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete, 742 
P.2d 105,108 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). The Valley Bank 
case offers no factual or legal support for Stanford. In this case, Parks did not do anything 
that impaired Stanford's ability to get at the collateral. Indeed, it was Stanford and 
Snowmass, by virtue of their default on the first trust deed, that impaired the collateral for the 
second trust deed. Stanford and Snowmass, by their default, triggered the inevitable 
foreclosure of the first trust deed. 
Where Stanford and Snowmass created the default on the first trust deed, they are not 
entitled to any equitable protection or offset based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation 
(or any other theory) on their guarantee of the now unsecured second trust deed held by Parks. 
Mead Corp., 907 P.2d at 1186. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are no issues of fact material to the trial court's ruling, and its ruling was correct 
as a matter of law. Parks therefore respectfully submit that the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this / / day of January, 2009. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Keith W. Meade 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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When Recorded, Mai! to: 
Keith W. Meade, Esq. 
P.O. Box 11008
 ru _ _ „ . - _ _ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 " 2 3 5 7 0 1 7 PS 1 OF 3 
y
 ERHES7 0 ROWLEY, 1CBER C O O T RECORDER 
31-JUL-08 317 PH FEE $ 1 5 . 0 0 OEP SPY 
REC FOR: COHNE RAPPORT * SEGAL 
TRUSTEE'S DEED 
Keith W> Meade, (herein called "Successor Trustee" or "Grantor"), as Successor Trustee 
under the Trust Deed hereinafter particularly described, does hereby bargain, sell, and convey 
without warranty to Bank of Utah as Custodian of the Kang S. Park IRA, 711 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 (hereinafter called "Grantee"), all of the real property situated in the County 
of Weber, State of Utah, described as follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
Part of Lots 2 and 3, Block 30, Plat "A", of Ogden City Survey: Beginning at a point 
2 feet East from the Southwest Corner of said Lot 2 and running thence West 67.485 
feet; theitce North 330 feet; thence East 65.485 feet; thence South 206 feet; thence 
East 2 feet; thence South 124 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with V* of the vacated street abutting thereon. 
01-026-001 i-fli, 
PARCEL 2: 
Part of Lot 2, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: Beginning at apoint 2 feet East 
of the Southwest Corner of said Lot 2 and running thence East 66.5 feet; thence 
North 234 feet; thence West 2.5 feet; thence North 96 feet; thence West 66 feet; 
thence South 206 feet; thence East 2 feet; thence South 124 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a perpetual right to use the following described tract of land for 
a road way to wit: a part of Lot 9, Block 30, Plat "A", Ogden City Survey: 
Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast Corner of said Lot 9 and running 
thence South 20 rods; thence West 3 rods; thence North 12 feet; thence East 37 !4 
feet; thence North 3 \ 8 feet; thence East 12 feet to the point of beginning. As created 
by Warranty Deed recorded December 17,1884, in Book S of Deeds at Page 107. 
Tax Pared No: 01-026-0010^A 
EH 2 3 5 7 0 1 7 PS 2 OF 3 
Said property is also known by the street address of: 
550 24th Street, Ogden, UT 84401 
This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Successor Trustee by the 
Trust Deed dated March 12,1992, executed by Kang S. Park, as Trustor, in which Associated Title 
Company was named as Trustee and Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska as 
Beneficiary, filed for record on March 17,1992 as Entry No. 1170790 in Book 1621, Pages 1098-
1122, Records of the County Recorder of Weber County, Utah; and after the fulfillment of the 
conditions specified in said Trust Deed authorizing this conveyance as follows: 
(a) Default occurred in the obligations for which such Trust Deed was given as 
security and the Beneficiary made demand upon said Successor Trustee to sell said property pursuant 
to the terms of said Trust Deed. Notice of Default was recorded on March 29,2007 as Entry No. 
2252429 in the Office of the Weber County Recorder (and in the Office of the Recorder of each 
county in which the property described in said Trust Deed, or any part thereof, is situated), the nature 
of such default being as set forth in said Notice of Default, and a copy of such notice was mailed by 
certified mail to each person who recorded a request therefor and as otherwise required by law. Such 
default still existed at the time of sale which was held July 31,2008. 
(b) More than three months after recordation of said Notice of Default, Successor 
Trustee gave notice of the time and place of the sale of said property by certified mail, by posting 
in a conspicuous place on the property to be sold and at the office of the County Recorder of each 
county in which the property described in said Trust Deed or any part thereof is situated, and by 
publishing in a newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the property is 
situated. 
(c) The provisions, recitals and contents of the Notice of Default referred to in 
paragraph (a) supra, shall be and they are hereby incorporated herein and made an integral part 
hereof for all purposes as though set forth herein at length. 
(d) All requirements of law, including those set forth in UCA §57-1-1, et. seq., 
regarding the mailing, posting, publications and recording of the Notice of Default, and Notice of 
Sale and of all other notices have been complied with. 
(e) Successor Trustee at the time and place of sale fixed by said notice, at public 
auction in one parcel struck off to Grantee, being the highest bidder therefor, the property herein 
descnbed for the sum of$AOOiO0O*/ subject, however, to all prior liens and encumbrances. No 
person or corporation offered to take any part of said property less than the whole thereof for the 
amount of principal, interest, advances and costs. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused his name to be hereunto subscribed this 
31* day of July, 2008. 
Keith W. Meade, Successor Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 31 * day of July, 2008, personally appeared before me, Keith W. Meade, who being 
by me duly sworn did say that he is the Successor Trustee and that the said Keith W. Meade 
acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument as such Trustee. 
LAWAYNE JONES 
NOTARY PUBLIC -STATE Of UTAH 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH #700 
SALT LAKE Cn% UT 941H 
My Comnv Exp. 06/26/200$ 
en/rruo/ 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salf Lake Co&...y, ~ ™ 
My Commission Expires: %jfiLh/{\ n 
FU.AWAYNEM ICHTH\ftufc\S»owm«*ATru«te«i Dewi wpd 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTS OF WEBER ) 
i HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COP/ 
OF THE DOCUMENT THAT APPEARS ON 
RECORD IN MY OFFICE. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL 
THIsJjLDAY OF /y*£C< 20 jLt 
ERNEST D. ROWLEY, WEBERCOUNTY REQ0RDER 
Exhibit 2 
Notice of Default 
te/f/ 
AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: 
Stuart T Matheson, Esq. 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone- (801)363-2244 
Title Co No • 
MMOJ No.. 010772m 
I f -
-W2252429-
E# 2 2 5 2 4 2 9 PC 1 OF 2 
ERNEST 0 ROWLEY, WEBER COUNTY RECORDER 
29-MAR-07 311 to FEE $14.00 DEP 3M 
REC FOR: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL 
On or about March 12, 1992, Kang S. Park, as trustor, executed and delivered to Associated 
Title Company, as Trustee, for the benefit of The Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
Lincoln, Nebraska, as Beneficiary, a trust deed to secure the performance by the trustor of the 
obligations under a promissory note. The Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Weber 
County Recorder, State of Utah, on March 17, 1992, as Entry No. 1170790, in Book 1621, at Page 
1098 and covers the following real property: 
PARCEL 1: PART OF LOTS 2 AND 3, BLOCK 30, PLAT"A", OF OGDEN CITY, 
SURVEY: BEGINNING AT A PONT 2 FEET EAST FROM THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF SAID LOT 2 AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 67.485 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 330 FEET; THENCE EAST 65.485 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 206 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 2 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 124 FEET TO THE POING OF 
BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH 1/2 OF THE VACATED STREET ABUTTING THEREON. 
PARCEL 2: PART OF LOT 2, BLOCK 30, PLAT "A", OGDEN CTrY SURVEY: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 2 FEET EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 
LOT 2 AND RUNNING THENCE EAST 66.5 FEET; THENCE NORTH 234 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 2.5 FEET; THENCE NORTH 96 FEET; THENCE WEST 66 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 206 FEET; THENCE EAST 2 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 124 FEET TO 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WrTH A PERPETUAL RIGHT TO USE THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
TRACT OF LAND FOR A ROAD WAY TO-WTT: A PART OF LOT 9, BLOCK 30, 
PLAT "A", OGDEN CITY SURVEY: BEGINNING AT A POINT 2 RODS WEST OF 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID LOT 9 AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 20 
RODS; THENCE WEST 3 RODS; THENCE NORTH 12 FEET; THENCE EAST 37 1/2 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 318 FEET; THENCE EAST 32 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. AS CREATED BY WARRANTY DEED RECORDED DECEMBER 17, 
1884, IN BOOK S OF DEEDS AT PAGE 107. 
Tax Parcel No.: 01-026-0011 
The Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska is the current holder of 
the beneficial interest under tie trust deed and Stuart T. Matheson is the current trustee. The 
obligations under the promissory note and trust deed are in default for failure to make the monthly 
payments. The principal balance is accelerated and due, together with any other obligations 
including interest, late charges, costs and trustees' and attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the trustee has 
elected to sell the property described in the trust deed as provided by law. 
THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED 
WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE, FOR QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 363-2244. 
OFFICE HOURS ARE 8:30 AM to 4:30 PM, MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY. 
DATED: March 28,2007. - -
Stuart T. Matheson, Successor Trustee 
State of Utah
 : s s 
Notary Public 
«, KATHLEEN K. CURTIS 
uu *—rfY» NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH 
f?f J ^ l JgJ 64* EAST 100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
My Comro Exp. 11/1 QttOOy 
Exhibit 3 
Notice of Trustee: 
ale 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, payable in lawful 
money of the United States at the East Main Entrance, Weber County Second District Courthouse, 2525 
Grant Ave., Ogden, Utah, on July 31,2007 at 11:30 AM, for the purpose of foreclosing a Trust Deed 
dated March 12, 1992 executed by Kang S. Park, as Trustor, in favor of The Security Mutual Life 
Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska, as Beneficiary, covering real property located in Weber 
County and described as follows: 
PARCEL 1: PART OF LOTS 2 AND 3, BLOCK 30, PLAT"A", OF OGDEN CITY, SURVEY: 
BEGINNING AT A PONT 2 FEET EAST FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID 
LOT 2 AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 67.485 FEET; THENCE NORTH 330 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 65.485 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 206 FEET; THENCE EAST 2 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 124 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH 1/2 OF THE VACATED STREET ABUTTING THEREON. 
PARCEL 2: PART OF LOT 2, BLOCK 30, PLAT "A", OGDEN CITY SURVEY: BEGINNING 
AT A POINT 2 FEET EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID LOT 2 AND 
RUNNING THENCE EAST 66.5 FEET; THENCE NORTH 234 FEET; THENCE WEST 2.5 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 96 FEET; THENCE WEST 66 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 206 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 2 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 124 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH A PERPETUAL RIGHT TO USE THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
TRACT OF LAND FOR A ROAD WAY TO-WIT: A PART OF LOT 9, BLOCK 30, PLAT 
"A", OGDEN CITY SURVEY: BEGINNING AT A POINT 2 RODS WEST OF THE 
NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID LOT 9 AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 20 RODS; 
THENCE WEST 3 RODS; THENCE NORTH 12 FEET; THENCE EAST 37 1/2 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 318 FEET; THENCE EAST 12 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
AS CREATED BY WARRANTY DEED RECORDED DECEMBER 17, 1884, FN BOOK S OF 
DEEDS AT PAGE 107. 
Tax Parcel No.: 01-026-0011 
The street address of the property is purported to be 550 East 24th Street, Ogden, UT 84401. The 
undersigned disclaims any liability for any error in the street address. The current Beneficiary of the 
trust deed is The Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln, Nebraska and the record owners 
of the property as of the recording of this notice of default is reported to be Kang S. Park. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the trustee $5,000.00 at the sale and the balance of the purchase 
price by 12:00 noon the day following the sale. Both payments must be in the form of a cashier's check 
or money order, cash and Bank "Official Checks" are not acceptable. A trustee's deed will be made 
available to the successful bidder within three business days following receipt of the bid amount. The 
sale is made without any warranty whatsoever, including but not limited to any warranty as to title, liens, 
possession, taxes, encumbrances, or condition of the property. The sale is subject to a workout 
Jinstatement, payoff, sale cancellation or postponement, incorrect bidding instructions, bankruptcy, or 
any other circumstance of which the trustee is unaware. In the event any of the foregoing apply, the sale 
will be void and the successful bidder's funds will be returned without any liability to the trustee or 
beneficiary for interest or any other damages. 
FORWARDED > G YOU 3Y 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THIS FIRM IS ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT 
AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WDLL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. 
Dated July 2, 2007. 
S\AMJ^ T, WIE(L. 
Stuart T. Matheson, Successor Trustee 
Matheson, Mortenson, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 363-2244 






Offic ia l F o r m 1 ,4 /071 
United States Bankruptcy Court 
District of Utah, Central Division Voluntary Petition 
Name of Debtor (if individual, enter Last, First, Middle): 
Snowmass, L.C. 
Name of Joint Debtor (Spouse) (Last, First, Middle) 
All Other Names used by the Debtor in the last 8 years 
(include married, maiden, and trade names): 
All Other Names used by the Joint Debtor in the last 8 years 
(include married, maiden, and tiade names): 
Last four digits of Soc. Sec./Complete EIN or other Tax ID No. (if more than one, state all)! 
87-0541124 
Last four digits of Soc Sec /Complete EIN or other Tax ID No (if more than one, stale ail). 
Street Address of Debtor (No. and Street, City, and State): 
c/o Gary B. Stanford 
1250 East 3900 South, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Street Address of Joint Debtor (No and Street, City, and State): 
ZIP Code ZIP Code 
I 84124 
County of Residence or of the Principal Place of Business: 
Salt Lake 
County of Residence or of the Principal Place of Business-
Mailing Address of Debtor (if different from street address): Mailing Address of Joint Debtor (if different from street address) 
ZIP Code ZIP Code 
Location of Principal Assets of Business Debtor 
(if different from street address above): 
550 East 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Chapter of Bankruptcy Code Under Which 
the Petition is Filed (Check one box) 
Type of Debtor 
(Form of Organization) 
(Check one box) 
D Individual (includes Joint Debtors) 
See Exhibit D on page 2 of this form. 
• Coiporation (includes LLC and LLP) 
D Partnership 
D Other (If debtor is not one of the above entities, 
check this box and state type of entity below.) 
Nature o f Business 
(Check one box) 
D Health Care Business 
I Single Asset Real Estate as defined 
in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (51B) 
D Railroad 
D Stockbroker 
D Commodity Broker 
D Clearing Bank 
• Other 
Tax-Exempt Entity 
(Check box, if applicable) 
D Debtor is a tax-exempt organization 
under Title 26 of the United States 
Code (the Internal Revenue Code). 
Q Chapter 7 
D Chapter 9 
• Chapter 11 
• Chapter 12 
Q Chapter 13 
D Chapter 15 Petition for Recognition 
of a Foreign Main Proceeding 
• Chapter 15 Petition for Recognition 
of a Foreign Nonmain Proceeding 
Nature of Debts 
(Check one box) 
D Debts are primarily consumer debts, 
defined in 11 U.SC. § 101(8) as 
"incurred by an individual primarily for 
a personal, family, or household purpose." 
H Debts are primarily 
business debts. 
Filing Fee (Check one box) 
• Full Filing Fee attached 
D Filing Fee to be paid in installments (applicable to individuals only). Must 
attach signed application for the court's consideration certifying that the debtor 
is unable to pay fee except in installments. Rule 1006(b). See Official Form 3A. 
D Filing Fee waiver requested (applicable to chapter 7 individuals only). Must 
attach signed application for the court's consideration. See Official Form 3B. 
Check one box: Chapter 11 Debtors 
D Debtor is a small business debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5 ID) 
• Debtor is not a small business debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C § 101(5 ID). 
Check if: 
• Debtor's aggregate noncontingent liquidated debts (excluding debts owed 
to insiders or affiliates) are less than $2,190,000. 
Check all applicable boxes: 
D A plan is being filed with this petition. 
D Acceptances of the plan were solicited prepetition from one or more 
classes of creditors, in accordance with 11 LI.S.C. § 1126(b). 
Statistical/Administrative Information 
• Debtor estimates that funds will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors. 
D Debtor estimates that, after any exempt property is excluded and administrative expenses paid, 
there will be no funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors. 

























D $10,001 to 
$ 100,000 









D $50,001 t( 
$100,000 
$100,001 to 
$1 million a 
$1,000,001 to 
$100 million 
D More than 
$100 million 
THIS SPACE IS FOR COURT USE ONLY 
Filed: 07/27/07 
Official Form 1 (4/07) 
Voluntary Petition 
I (This page must be completed and filed in every case) 
FORM Bl, Page 2 
Name of Debtor(s): 
Snowmass, L.C. 
1 All Prior Bankruptcy Cases Filed Within Last 8 Years (If more than two, attach additional sheet) 
Location 
j Where Filed: - None -
Location 





j Pending Bankruptcy Case Filed by any Spouse, Partner, or Affiliate of this Debtor (If more than one, attach additional sheet) j 
(Name of Debtor: 
- None -
District: \ 
1 Exhibit A 1 
(To be completed if debtor is required to file periodic reports (e.g., 
1 forms 10K and 10Q) with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and is requesting relief under chapter 11.) 
D Exhibit A is attached and made a part of this petition. 
Case Number: 
Relationship: 
Date Filed: j 
Judge: 1 
Exhibit B 1 
(To be completed if debtor is an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts ) j 
I, the attorney for the petitioner named in the foregoing petition, declare that 1 I 
have informed the petitionei that [he or she] may proceed under chapter 7, 11, 1 
12, or 13 of title 11, United States Code, and have explained the relief available I 
under each such chapter. I further certify that I delivered to the debtor the notice 
required by 11 U.S.C. §342(b) 
X 
Signature of Attorney for Debtor(s) (Date) I 
1 Exhibit C j 
1 Does the debtor own or have possession of any property that poses or is alleged to pose a threat of imminent and identifiable harm to public health or safety? 1 
j • Yes, and Exhibit C is attached and made a part of this petition. J 
1 • No I 
i Exhibit D 1 
j (To be completed by every individual debtor. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse must complete and attach a separate Exhibit D.) j 
1 • Exhibit D completed and signed by the debtor is attached and made a part of this petition. I 
1 If this is a joint petition: J 
1 D Exhibit D also completed and signed by the joint debtor is attached and made a part of this petition. I 
J Information Regarding the Debtor - Venue 
1 (Check any applicable box) j 
1 • Debtor has been domiciled or has had a residence, principal place of business, or principal assets in this District for 150 j 
I days immediately preceding the date of this petition or for a longer part of such 180 days than in any other District. I 
1 • There is a bankruptcy case concerning debtor's affiliate, general partner, or partnership pending in this District. 1 
j D Debtor is a debtor in a foreign proceeding and has its principal place of business or principal assets in the United States in 1 
1 this District, or has no principal place of business or assets in the United States but is a defendant in an action or j 
I proceeding [in a federal or state court] in this District, or the interests of the parties will be served in regard to the relief I 
] sought in this District. 1 
1 Statement by a Debtor Who Resides as a Tenant of Residential Property J 
1 (Check all applicable boxes) I 
D Landlord has a judgment against the debtor for possession of debtor's residence. (If box checked, complete the following.) j 
I (Name of landlord that obtained judgment) 
(Address of landlord) I 
• Debtor claims that under applicable nonbankruptcy law, there are circumstances under which the debtor would be 1 
permitted to cure the entire monetary default that gave rise to the judgment for possession, after the judgment for j 
possession was entered, and 1 
D Debtor has included in this petition the deposit with the court of any rent that would become due during the 30-day period 
after the filing of the petition. 
Official Form 1 (4/07) FORM Bl,Page3 
Voluntary Petition 
(This page must be completed and filed in every case) 
Name of Debtor(s): 
Snowmass, L.C. 
Signatures 
Signature(s) of Debtor(s) (Individual/Joint) 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in 
this petition is true and correct. 
[If petitioner is an individual whose debts are primarily consumer 
debts and has chosen to file under chapter 7] I am aware that I may 
proceed under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of title 11, United States 
Code, understand the relief available under each such chapter, and 
choose to proceed under chapter 7. 
[If no attorney represents me and no bankruptcy petition preparer 
signs the petition] I have obtained and read the notice required 
by 11 U.S.C. §342(b). 
I request relief in accordance with the chapter of title 11, United 
States Code, specified in this petition. 
x Signature of Debtor 
x 
Signature of Joint Debtor 
Telephone Number (If not represented by attorney) 
Date 
Signature of Attorney 
X is! Anna W. Drake 
Signature of Attorney for Debtor(s) 
Anna W. Drake A0909 
Printed Name of Attorney for Debtor(s) 
Anna W. Drake, P.C. 
Firm Name 
215 South State 
Suite 550 





July 27, 2007 
Date 
Signature of Debtor (Corporation/Partnership) 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in 
this petition is true and correct, and that I have been authorized to 
file this petition on behalf of the debtor. 
The debtor requests relief in accordance with the chapter of title 11 
United States Code, specified in this petition. 
X is! Gary B. Stanford 
Signature of Authorized Individual 
Gary B. Stanford 
Printed Name of Authorized Individual 
Managing Member 
Title of Authorized Individual 
July 27, 2007 
Date 
Signature of a Foreign Representative 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this petition 
is true and correct, that 1 am the foreign representative of a debtor in a foreign 
proceeding, and that I am authorized to file this petition. 
(Check only one box.) 
• I request relief in accordance with chapter 15 of title 11. United States Code. 
Certified copies of the documents required by 11 U.S.C. § 1515 are attached. 
• Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1511,1 request relief in accordance with the chapter 
of title 11 specified in this petition. A certified copy of the order granting 
recognition of the foreign main proceeding is attached. 
x 
Signature of Foreign Representative 
Printed Name of Foreign Representative 
Date 
Signature of Non-Attorney Bankruptcy Petition Preparer 
I declare under penalty of perjury that: (1) 1 am a bankruptcy 
petition preparer as defined in 1 1 U.S.C. § 1 10; (2) 1 prepared this 
document for compensation and have provided the debtor with a 
copy of this document and the notices and information required 
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(b), 110(h), and 342(b); and, (3) if rules or 
guidelines have been promulgated pursuant to I ! U.S.C. § 1 10(h) 
setting a maximum fee for services chargeable by bankruptcy 
petition preparers, I have given the debtor notice of the maximum 
amount before preparing any document for filing for a debtor or 
accepting any fee from the debtor, as required in that section. 
Official Form 19B is attached. 
Printed Name and title, if any, of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer 
Social Security number (If the bankrutpcy petition preparer is not 
an individual, state the Social Security number of the officer, 
principal, responsible person or partner of the bankruptcy petition 




Signature of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer or officer, principal, 
responsible person,or partner whose Social Security number \s 
provided above. 
Names and Social Security numbers of all other individuals who 
prepared or assisted in preparing this document unless the 
bankruptcy petition preparer is not an individual: 
If more than one person prepared this document, attach additional 
sheets conforming to the appropriate official form for each person. 
A bankruptcy petition preparer's failure to comply with the 
provisions of title 11 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure may result in fines or imprisonment or both 11 U.S.C. 
§110; 18 U.S.C §156. 
Exhibit 5 
Notice from Security 
Mutual? re: Sale 
EqnitiiMe 
L i f e anally 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
3 Triad Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180-1200 
November 15, 2007 
To Whom it May Concern: 
RE: Solicitation of Offers to Purchase Loan and Claim in Bankruptcy Proceeding 
Assurity Life Insurance Company, formerly known as The Security Mutual Life 
Insurance Company of Nebraska ("Assurity Life") is soliciting offers to purchase Assurity 
Life's interest in a loan secured by real property located in Weber County, Utah, (the "Loan") 
which loan is evidenced by the following documents: 
1. Promissory Note dated March 12, 1992 in the sum of $270,000.00 executed by 
Kang S. Park, as Borrower, in favor of Assurity Life, as Lender. 
2. Deed of Trust and Security Agreement dated March 12, 1992 executed by Kang 
S. Park, as Trustor, in favor of Assurity Life, as Beneficiary, recorded March 17, 1992 in the 
Office of the Weber County Recorder as Entry No. 1170790 in Book 1621 at Page 1098. 
3. Assignment of Rents and Leases dated March 12, 1992 executed by Kang S. 
Park, as Assignor, in favor of Assurity Life, as Assignee, recorded March 17, 1992 in the 
Office of the Weber County Recorder as Entry No. 1170791 in Book 1621 at Page 1123. 
4. Modification of Trust Deed dated August 28, 1995 executed by Snowmass, 
L.C, as Assignee, and Assurity Life, as Lender, recorded November 14, 1995 in the Office of 
the Weber County Recorder as Entry No. 1373490 in Book 1779 at Page 2854. 
5. Assumption Agreement dated August 28, 1995 by and among Kang S. Park, as 
Borrower, Snowmass, L.C, as Assignee, Marsha Park as original Guarantor and Richard 
Buckway and Dr. Gary B. Stanford as Additional Guarantors and Assurity Life, as Lender. 
6. The Guaranty of Dr. Gary B. Stanford undated, but making reference to the 
Assumption Agreement dated August 28, 1995. 
7. March 2002 Modification of Trust Deed recorded in the Office of the Weber 
County Recorder on December 31, 2002 as follows: 
Corporate 801 -579-3400 
National 800-352-5150 
Fax 801-579-3790 














The Proof of Claim dated September 12, 2007 and filed September 21, 2007 in that 
certain bankruptcy case pending in the United States Bankruptcy Case for the District of Utah 
entitled In re: Snowmass, LLC, Case No. 07-23458GEC (the "Bankruptcy Case"). 
Subject to receipt of an offer acceptable to Assurity Life, Assurity Life will assign its 
position in the Loan and the Proof of Claim by assignment, as is and without warranty or 
representation of any kind or nature. 
Offers to purchase shall be submitted in writing to the following: 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. 
3 Triad Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180-1200 
Attention: John C. Pitcher, Director of Mortgage Services 
such that they are received by not later than 5:00 p.m. M.S.T., November 26, 2007. All 
offers shall be unconditional and for cash, payable within forty-eight (48) hours of written 
acceptance of the offer. 
The minimum offer which Assurity Life will consider is $250,489.69, plus $53.83 per 
diem from and after November 30, 2007 to the date of closing of the sale. It is Assurity Life's 
intention to interplead with the Bankruptcy Court in the Bankruptcy Case all funds received 
from the highest offerer in excess of the minimum offer, less legal fees and costs associated 
with such interpleader, which funds are to be held, administered and distributed to the person 
or persons entitled thereto as the Bankruptcy Court may determine in the Bankruptcy Case. 
Very truly yours, 
EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Johi/C.Titcher 
Diractor of Mortgage Services 
Agent for Assurity Life Insurance Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 14th day of January, 2009, 
to the following: 
Russell S. Walker 
Reid W. Lambert 
Anthony M. Grover 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
F \LAWAYNE\1 KEITH\Park\Stanford\APPEALV»Ppelles bnefv2 (bms edits) wpd 
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